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WAS AGRICULTURAL DISTRESS IN THE
1930 s A RESULT OF LAND
SPECULATION DURING WORLD WAR I?
THE CASE OF IOWA
by Lowell K. Dyson
Blacksburg, Virginia
Professor Dyson toas born in Adel, Iowa and obtained
his undergraduate degree from Iowa State University. He
received his M. A. and Ph. D. from Columbia University
as a Lydia C. Roberts Fellow, and has taught at the Uni-
versities of Ioioa and Maryland respectively. Professor Dyson
is presently an Assistant Professor at Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and Universiy, Blacksbmg, Va.
During the winter of the Great American Interregnum,
between the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in Nov.
1932 and his inauguration four months. later, an already
stunned nation examined the fabric of its society for the
faults which had brought on the worst depression in history.
Critics found a plenitude of targets—capitalism, the banking
system, the stock market, and sometimes even those who
had suffered most, the unemployed and the dispossessed.
Indeed, the pangs of self-accusation gnawed at a host of
the jobless who felt that the Twentieth Century world had
shunted them aside, stamped with the label, "rejected."
Something of the same was true in rural America where
millions of farmers either had already lost or stood in im-
minent danger of losing their land. Were these men the vic-
tims of their own past errors? This study seeks the answer
in one rich agricultural state, Iowa, but the findings have
significance for farming areas throughout the nation.
According to one estimate, Iowa farms in 1932 carried
a mortgage burden of $1,082,882,000.' This figure was slightly
lower than that of 1930 when the United States Department
of Agriculture indicated that farm debt in the Hawkeye State
amounted to 11.9 per cent of the total for the nation, leading
the second state, Illinois, by almost a half billion dollars.^
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By 1932 the number of forced sales averaged more than
seventeen a day, and outraged Iowa farmers began a protest
movement against any further foreclosures, which sometimes
spilled over into violence.'"
The sad plight of many farmers awakened the attention
of the nation and led eventually to the passage of relief
legislation by the Roosevelt administration, but there existed
widespread suspicion in 1932 and 1933 that mral avarice
had precipitated the whole problem. William Allen White,
for example, showed little sympathy for his neighbors who
had overexpanded during the boom times of World War I,
and Josephine Herbst found during a tour of the Midwest
that many small town people felt that farmers were getting
exactly what they deserved for having speculated in land
during the period of high prices of 1918 and 1919. The dean
of Iowa joumalists, Harvey Ingham, told his readers, "The
fact is that the farm west has been using land too much as
basis of speculation and far too little as the home of the
farm." Others agreed.^
Probably no historian would contest the belief that there
had been a good deal of gambling in land. When the com-
modity price index rose from the prewar average of 100
to 181 in 1917 and 211 in 1920," land values were bound to
follow. By 1920, Iowa land was selling for 213 per cent of
prewar prices.^ The area of encumbered land increased
between 1915 and 1920 from 38 to 47 per cent of the total, and
the estimated farm mortgage debt climbed to $1,500,000,000
from the earlier $685,000,000." Disregarding the warnings of
a few Cassandras, many farmers confidently predicted that
land values would soon triple and quadruple.' For a time
it seemed, according to the managing editor of Wallaces'
Farmer, that speculators were so busy "sitting around the
livery stable and playing games with options," that no time
remained to hitch up a team for field work.^
Obviously then, land did become an article of speculation
from 1917 through 1920. This meant that many purchasers
— often non-farmers—bought their acres for the express
purpose of profiting from resale at an appreciated price.
They regarded the money made in normal farming operations
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as a minor factor in their investments. At the same time,
many tenants sought to take a step up the agricultural ladder
by becoming owners while small holders hoped to enlarge
their operations to take advantage of the efficiencies offered
by new methods and machinery. The problem is to distinguish
between these modest aspirations and the operations of the
gamblers, and to determine whether farmers in 1932 and
1933 were suffering for their greed of a dozen or so years
earlier.
The boundary line between serious investment and
speculation has no exact location, and the definition is ob-
scure. There are at least three indicators, however, which
if used carefully can suggest answers. Speculators operate
on the risk capital of others; therefore, they often need to
go beyond first mortgages into a series of junior mortgages;
their funds come from sources uninhibited by legal limits
or cautious tradition; and their mortgage debt per acre is
likely to be quite high.
Gonservative lenders recognized first mortgages as sound
investments in most cases. Second, third, and fourth mort-
gages rest on surety far less firm and on the probability
of a high level or risk. In 1915, a year of agricultural stability,
junior mortgages made up only 11 per cent of all loans in
a study of farms in thirteen representative Iowa townships.
During the next six years, while first mortgages slightly
more than doubled in value — consistent witih the general
rise in the price index — junior mortgages increased almost
fourfold until they made up about 19 per cent of loans out-
standing. In the next few years speculators found their pur-
chases far less attractive as the result of the drop in com-
modity prices, and by 1925 the value of junior mortgages
had fallen off by a tiiird. Those who had gambled on the
constant appreciation in land values were seeking other and
greener pastures. At the end of the decade the ratio of junior
debts to the total was less than in 1915. Farm owners had
liquidated a major portion of their second, third, and fourth
mortgages prior to the onset of the Great Depression and
had cut them further before the organized anti-mortgage
campaigns of the 1932-33 wdnter."
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TABLE I.—Estimated Junior Mortgage Debt In Iowa for Selected Years
Year
( Dec. 31 )
1915
1920
1921
1925
1930
1932
Total Mortgage
Debt
• 685,114,000
1,499,577,000
1,609,744,000
1,531,192,000
1,265,456,000
1,082,882,000
(Oct. 15)
Junior Mortgage
Debt
77,189,000
262,848,000
300,699,000
210,225,000
115,785,000
85,824,000
Junior Mortgages
as per cent of total
11.3
17.6
18.7
13.7
9.1
7.9
SOURCE: Based on infonnation contained in William G. Murray and
Ronald G. Bentley, "The Iowa Farm Mortgage Problem," in The Agri-
cultural Emergency in Iowa (Ames, Iowa: 1933), 56 and 62. Murray
and Bentley used the ratio, 1:111, to estimate the State total from the
figures in thirteen representative townships.
If the type of mortgage presents one possible measure
of speculation, the source of loan money suggests another.
During the period under consideration, two groups of in-
vestors, insurance companies and private individuals,
provided about three-fourths of farm loans in Iowa.'" The
insurance companies pursued decidedly cautious conduct.
They would not accept junior mortgages nor would they
take first mortgages which represented more than 50 per
cent of the value of the land." As a result, although the
cash value of their mortgage holdings steadily increased
from 1915 until 1920, according to the thirteen tovraship study,
their share of the total mortgage market dropped from 22
per cent to 20. At the same time, private investors, under
no restraint, boosted their portion from 54 per cent to 61.'^
The rapid plunge of farm prices in the autumn of 1920
brought an end to the rosy dreams of ever-ascending prices
for agricultural land. Those who had speculated in 1919 on
the basis of $1.50 com and $20.00 hogs woke to the prospect
of paying their debts with 50 cent corn and $7.00 hogs.''' A
great wave of foreclosures resulted. Whereas in the five
year period, 1916-20, there had been an estimated $3,400,000
of judgments in Iowa, the next five years brought $111,400,000,
with the peak year being 1924. A study of fifteen selected
counties showed that private investors bought 6i per cent,
in value, of these actions while insurance companies ac-
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counted for slightly less than 8 per cent." A dramatic drop
after 1920 in the percentage of outstanding farm debt held
by private investors suggests once again that speculators
were cutting their losses while the more conservative in-
surance companies continued a steady rate of finaneing based
on their view of solid investment. Federally ehartered land
banks, following policies similar to insurance companies,
increased their share of the market from 2 per eent in 1920
to 12 per cent a decade later."
TABLE II.—Estimated Value of Iowa Farm Debt Held by Private
Lenders and Insuranca Companies
Year
(Dec. 31)
1915
1920
1925
1930
1932
Percentage of Total
Insurance
Gompanies
22
20
32
39
42
(Oct. 15)
Private
Lenders
54
61
43
32
27
Dollar
Insurance
Gompanies
150,725,000
299,915,000
489,981,000
493,529,000
454,810,000
Value
Private
Lenders
369,962,000
899,846,000
658,413,000
404,946,000
292,378,000
SOURCE: Based on infomiation contained in William G. Murray and
Ronald G. Bentley, "The Iowa Fami Mortgage Problem," in The Agri-
cultural Emergency in Iowa (Ames, Iowa: 1933), 56 and 66. The
same ratio used as in Table I.
The great reduction of junior mortgages and the dramatic
increase in the percentage of mortgages held by institutions
cautiously selective in their loaning policies, together indicate
that the truly speculative investors of 1917-20 had fled the
scene well before 1932. There is further evidence of this as
well. Land speculation presupposes a high debt per acre.
The gambler ventures little capital, but he must amortize
the heavy interest charges and large principal payments
through continued high prices and by an appreciation in
land values. If the reverse case occurs, if prices collapse
as in 1920, then interest payments lapse, and the capital
advanced in speculation is lost.
Reasonable indebtedness of Iowa farm land during the
years from 1915 to 1930 would have ranged from $50 to $75
per acre.'"" The study of thirteen representative Iowa town-
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ships showed that 21.1 per cent of mortgaged farms in 1921
fell within this range as compared to 26.3 per cent in 1932—
not a startling variance. In the higher, speculative ranges of
indebtedness, however, there were striking contrasts. In 1932,
only 15.1 per cent of farms mortgaged carried an encumbrance
of over $100 per acre, but eleven years earlier, when the effect
of the boom was still current, the figure had been 41.3 per
cent. And in the most ethereal realms of speculation, almost
10 per cent of farms mortgaged in 1921 had soared to above
$200 per acre debt; by 1932 debts on this level had been almost
completely wiped out, sinking to a comparatively insignificant
1.4 per cent.'" The nature of the investment pattern is quite
plain. During the period of high commodity prices, some
farmers and other land buyers had encumbered themselves
with mortgages that proved disastrously high after 1920; but
by Oct. 1932, the overwhelming majority of farms lnortgaged
carried an indebtedness that cautious lenders had considered
at an eminently safe level before the onset of the depression.
If judged by each of the three criteria—number of junior
mortgages, source of money, and debts per acre mortgaged—
then there obviously was speculation in Iowa farm land during
the years, 1917-20. The downward spiral of commodity prices,
beginning late in 1920, brought in its wake a flood of fore-
closures over the period of the next few years. After a peak
in 1924, the volume of forced sales declined thereafter during
every year but one until 1931." Most, if not all, of the
speculators from the boom times gave up their deeds to
Iowa farm lands and escaped from their earlier deals as
best they could by the mid-twenties. Those who remained
in possession were men who aimed primarily at making
a reasonable living from the sale of their produce rather
than profits from the appreciation in the value of their acres,
and they were encouraged by the moderate increase in com-
modity prices which began in the autumn of 1924.
Over the next five years, from 1925 through 1929, the ex-
change values of Iowa farm products fluctuated between
91 and 96 per cent of prewar.'^ The golden level of parity
was never equalled in other words, but it seemed within
the realm of possible achievement. As a result, Iowa farmers
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bought thousands of tractors, trucks, and cars. They taxed
themselves for new schools, and they expanded their network
of roads until by 1932 only three others surpassed the
Hawkeye State in miles of portland cement highways.'"
Insurance companies did not change their loan policies
during the nineteen-twenties. They hewed to the conservative
line which had kept them relatively free from the speculative
binge of the wartime years. They foreclosed on very few
farms from 1921 to 1925.°° After 1924, the insurance companies
and the equally cautious land banks increased the volume
of their loans to fanners. Since their guidelines had not
changed, it must be assumed that they viewed Iowa mor-
tgages as safe investments during the second half of the
decade.
With the onset of the Creat Depression most Iowa farmers
found themselves in distress if not despair. But almost as
deeply troubled were the insurance companies and land banks
which were now forced to foreclose on the seemingly gilt-
edged loans of a few years earlier. All the trusted economic
guidelines of the past had gone haywire when the price of
Iowa corn dropped from ninety cents a bushel in Sept. 1930
to twelve cents in Dec. two years later.^' By Dec. 31, 1932,
insurance companies owned 4,308 Iowa fanns. They had
acquired almost 40 per cent of them dining the preceding
twelve months, and for the first time in history they had
taken over at least one farm in each of the ninety-nine
counties during the year.^ ° The easy explanation that farmers
were suffering from their speculative greed of a dozen years
earlier was simply not true. The conservative judgments
of both borrower and lender did not apply in a world seized
by economic irrationality.
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